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FOREWORD:
LABOR ARBITRATION THIRTY YEARS
AFTER THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY
MARTIN

H.

MALIN*

On June 20, 1960, the Supreme Court issued its decisions in what
has become known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.' The Trilogy culminated
the process of federalization of the law of collective bargaining agreements which began with the enactment of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 2 The Court held that an employer may not defend against an action
to compel arbitration on the ground that the underlying grievance is frivolous, that grievances are presumed to be arbitrable and parties to a collective bargaining agreement should be compelled to arbitrate unless it
can be said with positive assurance that the agreement withdrew the matter from arbitration, and that a court should enforce an arbitration award
as long as the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court's holdings freed the arbitration process from the
threat of heavy-handed judicial regulation and allowed arbitration, which
already was well-established as a system of industrial self-government, to
flourish.
In the three decades since the Trilogy the Court has reaffirmed its
principles on numerous occasions. 3 The workplace, however, has experienced numerous changes in labor relations, union representation, demographic composition and in the nature of the law, among other areas.
Many of these changes have had an impact on the institution of labor
arbitration. Accordingly, as we mark the thirtieth anniversary of the
* Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law
Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A. 1973 Michigan State University; J.D. 1976 George Washington University. I am grateful for the research assistance of Siobhan Murphy, Chicago-Kent College
of Law, class of 1991. Financial support for this symposium was provided by the Marshall Ewell
Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
3. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987); AT&T
Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-51 (1986); Schneider Moving & Storage
Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1984) (upholding general presumption of arbitrability but
excepting employee benefit fund trustees' actions against employers); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1983); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S.
368, 376-80 (1974); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549-551 (1964).
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Trilogy, it is appropriate to examine the state of the institution of labor
arbitration and the law of the workplace in light of these changes. This is
the purpose of this special symposium.
In this foreword, I shall review the state of labor arbitration as it
existed at the time of the Trilogy, the state of the law at the time of the
Trilogy, and the contribution of the Trilogy to the institution of labor
arbitration. Second, I will chronicle many of the changes which have
occurred in the workplace and the law governing the workplace in the
thirty years since the Trilogy. I will conclude by introducing the articles
in this symposium in the context of the developments in the workplace
since the Trilogy.
I.

THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION
BEFORE THE TRILOGY

The use of arbitration to resolve labor disputes has been traced as far
back as the Revolutionary War. 4 During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, labor arbitration began to gain favor as a means of
settling labor disputes. In 1871 arbitration was used for the first time to
resolve grievances in the anthracite coal industry. 5 Thereafter, arbitration was used in the coal, apparel, entertainment and railroad industries,
and, in 1937, received a major boost when the United Auto Workers and
General Motors agreed to submit unresolved grievances to a neutral
umpire.

6

As World War II approached, labor arbitration gained acceptability
as a method of settling grievances during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. During the second world war, arbitration became firmly
established as the preferred method of resolving grievance disputes. This
was due, in large part, to the policies of the National War Labor Board.
President Roosevelt established the National War Labor Board on
January 12, 1942 and charged it with settling labor disputes that
4. Professor Lawrence Stessin has related the use of a local clergyman to arbitrate a dispute
between an ironmonger and his employer over whether the employee was entitled to "danger pay"
for forging a chain and stretching it across the Hudson River to protect George Washington's army
from the British. Stessin, Expedited Arbitration: Less Grief over Grievances, HARV. Bus. REV. Jan.Feb. 1977, at 128, 133 (1977).
5. The Anthracite Board of Trade and the Workingmen's Benevolent Association submitted
disputes over allegedly discriminatory discharges to Judge William Ewell of Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, the parties employed Judge Ewell to decide their "bill of wages." See R.
FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PRocEss 2 (1965); E. WITrE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION

11 (1952).

6. See generally, Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 U. FLA.
L. REV. 373 (1983).
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threatened to disrupt war time production. 7 The WLB encouraged the
parties to include grievance and arbitration provisions in their collective
bargaining agreements and generally ordered the inclusion of such provisions when one party resisted it." The WLB's policies helped labor arbitration attain wide-spread acceptance as the preferred method for settling
disputes over the interpretation and application of collective bargaining
agreements. In 1944, seventy-three percent of all collective bargaining
agreements contained arbitration provisions. 9 In November 1945, President Truman convened a National Labor-Management Conference. One
of the few matters on which representatives from employer groups, the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were able to agree was the desirability of having a grievance procedure culminating in binding third party arbitration in every collective
bargaining agreement. 10
Prior to the Labor Management Relations Act of 194711 enforcement of collective bargaining agreements was left to state courts applying
state law. 1 2 Initially, state courts were reluctant to enforce collective bargaining agreements at all, reasoning that they lacked mutuality and interfered with individual contracts of employment and the ability of the
parties to terminate their relationships at will. The New York courts
rejected the traditional arguments against enforcement. In Schlessinger
v. Quinto l3 the court found mutuality in an agreement between a multiemployer association and the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union in each party's obligation and ability to discipline its members to
compel them to abide by the agreement's provisions. 14 Many other juris7.

Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).

8. See generally Freidin & Ulman, Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 58 HARV. L. REV.
309 (1945); R. FLEMING, supra note 5, at 14-21.
9. R. FLEMING, supra note 5, at 18. Today, 98 percent of all collective bargaining agreements
have such provisions. BASIC PATTERNS 1N UNION CONTRACTS 37 (12th ed. 1989).

10. Attendees at the conference were a virtual Who's Who of American Industrial Relations.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Div. OF LABOR STANDARDS,

BULLETIN No. 77, THE PRESIDENT'S

NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 5-30, 1945 77 (1946). President Truman charged them, among other things, "to find methods not only of peaceful negotiation of labor

contracts, but also of insuring industrial peace for the lifetime of such contracts." Id. at 39. The
conference delegates responded to this charge:
The parties should provide by mutual agreement for the final determination of any unsettled grievances or disputes involving the interpretation or application of the agreement by

an impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator or board.
Id. at 46.
11. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167 (1988)).

12. See generally Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal
System, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1109 (1941); Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE
L.J. 195 (1938).
13. 201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922), aff'g, 117 Misc. 735, 192 N.Y.S. 564 (1921).
14. 201 A.D. at 498-99, 194 N.Y.S. at 410.
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dictions followed Schlessinger, but several continued to adhere to their
general positions that unions and employees could not enforce collective
bargaining agreements because they lacked consideration or mutuality.1 5
Even though a pre-Trilogy court might enforce some provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement, it might find others troublesome. Some
state courts refused to enforce provisions requiring just cause for discharge on the ground that the employment relationship, being of an indefinite duration, was terminable at will. 16 Even if a court enforced a just
cause provision, it might refuse to award reinstatement because of the
policy against enjoining breaches of personal service contracts, although
some courts awarded reinstatement when the union, as opposed to the
individual employee, brought the action.1 7 To the extent that enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement required that the union, rather
than the individual employee, bring the action, the situation was complicated by the law in many states which refused to recognize a union as a
legal entity with the capacity to sue unless it was incorporated."'
State law was as inconsistent in enforcing grievance arbitration as it
was in enforcing collective bargaining agreements generally. The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act of 1939 authorized the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to appoint competent, impartial and
disinterested persons as arbitrators and provided that arbitration agreements were enforceable to the same extent as any other contract.' 9 Many
courts in other jurisdictions, however, relying on common-law principles
or state arbitration acts, were outwardly hostile to labor arbitration. A
frequently cited example of state court hostility to labor arbitration is
International Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.20 A
clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that the company
would "meet with the Union . . . to discuss the payment of a bonus
....
"21
The union grieved the company's refusal to pay any bonus,
contending that the contract bound the company to pay a bonus and left
the amount for negotiation, with the arbitrator to fix the amount if the
parties could not agree. The court refused to compel the company to
arbitrate, reasoning, "If the meaning of the provision of a contract
15. See Witmer, supra note 12, at 202-03; Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising From Collective
Labor Contracts, 3 Mo. L. REV. 252, 259-66 (1938)(discussing Missouri cases allowing enforcement
despite the at will rule).
16. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W.2d 749 (1936); Crotty v.
Erie R.R., 149 A.D. 262, 133 N.Y.S. 696 (1912).
17. See Hamilton, supra note 15, at 272 and n.97.
18. See generally M. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 2-3 (1988).
19. Act of May 4, 1939, ch. 57, no. 154, A., 1939 Wis. Laws 77.
20. 271 A.D. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
21. 271 A.D. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
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to
sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything 22
arbitrate, and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration.
State courts also actively reviewed the merits of arbitral awards.
They justified their intervention by relying on provisions in collective
bargaining agreements which restricted the arbitrator to interpreting and
applying the contract and prevented the arbitrator from modifying the
contract. In many cases, pre-Trilogy courts, in the guise of determining
whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers, interpreted the
contract de novo. For example, in Screen CartoonistsGuild, Local 852 v.
Disney,23 the contract provided for paid holidays when they fell within
the work week. The arbitrator held that this provision required the company to pay holiday pay when the holidays fell on the weekend. The
arbitrator acknowledged that the contract defined the regular hours of
work as five eight-hour shifts, Monday through Friday, but observed that
the contract also provided for premium pay for the sixth and seventh
days of a work week. Indeed, the only places where the contract used the
term work week were the premium pay and holiday pay clauses. The
arbitrator concluded that the parties intended that "work week" include
Saturdays and Sundays.
The court refused to enforce the arbitrator's award. The court reasoned that the term work week as used in the holiday pay clause had to
refer to the regular eight hour shifts on Monday through Friday because,
if the parties intended to include weekends, there would have been no
reason to expressly provide for pay when holidays fell within a work
week. Based on this de novo review of the arbitrator's interpretation, the
court concluded that the award conflicted with the clear language of the
contract and therefore exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's authority by
modifying, rather than interpreting, the contract.
To a similar effect is the court's decision in Western Union Co. v.
CommunicationsAssociation.24 The arbitrator had held that the contractual no strike clause did not bar the union from refusing to handle "hot
traffic," that is messages for employers with whom the union had a dispute. The arbitrator based his conclusion on a custom in the trade
whereby non-striking employees were generally allowed to refuse to handle hot traffic. The court, however, disagreed, finding that the award
conflicted with the court's broad interpretation of the no strike clause's
22. Id. See generally Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the
Looking Glass, 2 BuF. L. REV. 1 (1952).
23. 74 Cal. App. 2d 414, 168 P.2d 983 (1946).
24. 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949). For detailed criticism of the decision, see Mayer,
Judicial Bulls in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LAB. L.J. 502 (1951).
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prohibition of "stoppages of work" and concluded that the arbitrator improperly modified the contract. These and similar decisions led Professor Clyde Summers to characterize judicial involvement in arbitration as
follows:
Undaunted by their adventures in the Wonderland of labor disputes,
the courts have eagerly entered the Looking Glass World of labor arbitration. Anxious to join in the activities, they have been unaware of
their awkwardness and undismayed by their blunders. Like Alice,
longed to be
they have not been entirely content to be pawns, but 2have
5
queens in this world quite reversed from their own.
II.

THE FEDERALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND THE TRILOGY

The judicial hostility toward labor arbitration began to change with
the federalization of collective bargaining. The Labor Management Re26
lations Act of 1947 declared a federal labor policy favoring arbitration.
Section 301 provided that actions for breach of contracts between a labor
27
organization and an employer may be brought in federal district court.
28
In its seminal Lincoln Mills decision, the Supreme Court interpreted
section 301 to federalize the common law of collective bargaining
agreements.
Lincoln Mills produced considerable negative commentator reaction. Professors Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington predicted that
courts would be called upon to draft a law of labor contracts on a caseby-case basis and would rely primarily on the common law of commercial contracts. They considered this to be unfortunate, and predicted, in
light of prior judicial involvement with collective bargaining, a negative
result.
[A] half-century of often painful and disagreeable experience cries
aloud that labor problems emphasize most dramatically the limitations
of the judicial process as an instrumentation for the formulation of
social policy. It is not likely that the common law of contracts will
prove a more fitting source of rules to bridle the forces of labor unrest
than the common law of property or the common or Sherman Act
29 law
of unfair competition, on which courts have drawn in the past.
Similarly, Professor Benjamin Aaron expressed concern that Lincoln
25. Summers, supra note 22, at 1;see also Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 616 (1950).
26. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes ...." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).

28. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
29. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess" The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1957).
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Mills signaled the coming of a heavy handed federal law of collective
bargaining agreements which would ensure that those who lost in arbitration would seek and receive a more hospitable judicial forum in which
30
the award would be reviewed.
With perfect hindsight, we can see that Lincoln Mills became the
31
intermediate step between enactment of the LMRA and the Trilogy.
Although the Court has ruled on other aspects of the federal common
law of collective bargaining agreements, 32 the Trilogy is certainly its most
far-reaching interpretation.
In American Manufacturing and Warrior and Gulf the Court put
such cases as Cuttler-Hammarto rest. The Court declared that the federal labor policy favoring arbitration required that courts not consider
the merits of a grievance in the guise of ruling on arbitrability. The
Court recognized that when parties agree to be bound by a grievance and
arbitration procedure they agree that in the event they cannot settle a
dispute over what their contract means, the contract means whatever a
mutually selected arbitrator reads it to mean. Thus, although substantive
arbitrability is an issue for the court, a court must avoid entanglement
with the merits of the grievance and leave that matter entirely to the
arbitrator. Therefore, unless it can be said with positive assurance that
the grievance is not arbitrable, the court must order arbitration.
A comparison of Judge Fuld's dissent in Cutler-Hammer with Justice Douglas' opinion in American Manufacturing markedly demonstrates the Trilogy's impact on the judicial approach to determining
arbitrability. Judge Fuld argued that the grievance was arbitrable because reasonable minds could differ over the interpretation of the contract's provision that the parties would discuss a bonus, but conceded
that, "A claim may be so unconscionable or a defense so frivolous as to
33
justify the Court in refusing to order the parties to ... arbitration.
Justice Douglas, in contrast, opined that even patently frivolous grievances must proceed to arbitration. He quoted favorably from Professor
Archibald Cox who urged that arbitration of even frivolous grievances
30. Aaron, On FirstLooking into the Lincoln Mills Decision, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1959).
31. Other commentators, similarly aided by hindsight, have debated whether the fears of Lincoln Mills were justified or whether the Trilogy was pre-ordained. Compare Morris, Twenty Years of
Trilogy: A Celebration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 331 (1981) with St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).

32. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Local 721, United
Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).

33. 297 N.Y. at 520, 74 N.E.2d at 464.
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serves a therapeutic function in the work place. 34 Thus, the Court recognized that grievance arbitration serves broader purposes than does judicial resolution of disputes.
In Enterprise Wheel the Court put to rest decisions such as Disney
and Western Union. The Court made clear that courts must not rely on
contract language confining the arbitrator to interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement as an invitation to review arbitral interpretations
de novo. The Court reiterated that contract interpretation is for the arbitrator, and established the duty of a court to enforce the award as long as
the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
III.

LABOR RELATIONS, LABOR LAW AND ARBITRATION

30 YEARS LATER
The environment in which labor arbitration operated in 1960 was
characterized by a strong, stable labor movement, confined almost entirely to the private sector, negotiating collective bargaining agreements
to regulate otherwise unregulated work places. Each of these characteristics has changed markedly over the last thirty years.
In 1960, organized labor was strong and stable. There were approximately 15,516,000 union members and unions represented 28.6 percent
of the non-agricultural work force. Although union density had declined
from a peak of 32.5 percent of the non-agricultural work force in 1953,
union density remained stable while total membership grew over the next
fifteen years. 35 Union influence on the work place, moreover, was not
confined to the employees actually covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Many employers extended many of the benefits that unions
gained for their members through collective bargaining to the non-unionized segments of their work forces. Many non-unionized employers imported features of collective bargaining agreements into their work places
as well. Collective bargaining had an overall effect of regularizing em36
ployment relations in union and non-union shops alike.
Union influence as a regulator of the work place has declined markedly since the Trilogy. In 1990, only 16.1 percent of the work force were
34. 363 U.S. at 568 n.6 (quoting Cox, CurrentProblems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
L. REV. 247, 261 (1958)).
35. Congressional Research Service, Report on Implications for Economic Policy and Labor
Legislation of Decline in Union Membership (1986). By 1975, union membership had grown to
22,153,000 and unions represented 28.9 percent of the non-agricultural work force.
36. See generally S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & R. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960).
ROCKY MTN.
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union members. 37 As the percentage of the work force represented by
unions has declined, so has the extent of the collective bargaining agreement's role in regulating the work place.
In 1960, the nation relied on collective bargaining as the primary
regulator of the work place. The only major federal legislation regulating
the work place other than the National Labor Relations Act was the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Indeed, this situation was consistent with the congressional vision in enacting the NLRA, a vision of private collective
bargaining redressing inequality in the work place with enforcement
38
through private grievance arbitration.
Collective bargaining, however, did not provide the solution to all
problems of the work place. Perhaps collective bargaining's most significant inadequacy was its failure to handle racial discrimination in employment. In many areas of the economy, unions contributed to the problem.
In others, they failed to be part of the solution. 39 Recognition of collective bargaining's failure to provide equal employment opportunity contributed to enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 40 This
was followed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 4 1 the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 42 and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. 43 More recent additions have included the Worker
Adjustment Retraining Notification Act," the Employee Polygraph Pro46
tection Act, 45 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In 1960 employees not protected by collective bargaining agreements were generally regarded as terminable at will. Although a year
earlier, the California Appellate Court recognized a cause of action in
tort for an employee fired allegedly for refusing to perjure, himself before
a legislative committee, 47 it would be another 14 years before a court in
another jurisdiction recognized a similar tort claim. 48 Since that time, a
majority of jurisdictions have come to recognize the tort of abusive dis37.

Union Membership Stays on Downward Trend, Falling to 16.1 Percent of Employment,

DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 26 at B-8 (Feb. 7, 1991).

38. See Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changingof the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV.
7, 8-10 (1988).
39. See generally W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977); Summers, supra
note 38, at 11.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-50 (1988).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1988).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1990), Pub. L. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-06 (1990), Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 338 (1990).
47. Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
48. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
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charge. 49 Many jurisdictions have softened their inflexible rule in contract that indefinite employment agreements are terminable at will and
have recognized contractual promises of job security. 50 Many jurisdictions have also applied traditional torts to the work place in new ways,
recognizing claims for defamation, 5 intentional infliction of emotional
53
distress, 52 and invasion of privacy.
Thus, unlike the arbitrator at the time of the Trilogy who generally
was able to assume that he or she was the exclusive forum to redress
alleged wrongs in the work place and that the collective bargaining
agreement was the exclusive source of restraints on management's conduct, today's arbitrator is called on to resolve grievances which raise issues that also are capable of resolution before administrative agencies
and courts. A consequence of increased statutory and judicial regulation
of the work place is that today's arbitration award may draw its essence
from the contract but still be denied enforcement if a court finds that it is
contrary to public policy. 54 Furthermore, with increasing frequency, employees face situations where litigating may yield a significantly greater
recovery than resorting to the grievance and arbitration procedure. For
example, a discharged employee may decide to seek compensatory and
punitive damages in a tort action instead of, or in addition to, reinstatement and back pay through the grievance procedure. This has led to
frequent litigation over the degree to which a collectively bargained
grievance and arbitration procedure precludes employees from alternative judicial and administrative forums. 55
49. See generally Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A QuadrennialAssessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 1, 1984 (suggesting that three-fifths of the
states recognize a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge).
50. See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373 (1988); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622 (Minn. 1983).
51. See, e.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
52. See, e.g., Counce v. MBM Co., 266 Ark. 1064, 597 S.W.2d 92 (1979); Murray v. Bridgeport
Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 56, 480 A.2d 610 (1984); Agis v. Howard Johnson Corp., 371 Mass. 140, 355
N.E.2d 315 (1976); Contieras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Samore v. Eric Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1990) (right
based in California Constitution); Patel v. Thomas, 793 P.2d 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Miller v.
Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 976, 560 N.E.2d 900 (1990).
54. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757
(1983).
55. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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The increase in outside regulation of the work place has also increased the pressure on arbitrators to consider that regulation in addition
to the express provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The National Labor Relations Board has added to that pressure. Although the
Board's seminal Spielberg56 decision (announcing a policy of deferring to
arbitration awards in certain unfair labor practice proceedings growing
out of the same incident that gave rise to the grievance) was five years old
when the Trilogy was decided, it was not until eleven years later that the
Board announced its Collyer 57 doctrine denying charging parties who
chose not to use the grievance procedure their choice of forum before the
NLRB.
The increased pressure on arbitrators to consider the law external to
the collective bargaining agreement when resolving grievances has
spawned a debate among commentators over the degree, if any, to which
arbitrators should succumb to this pressure.5 8 It has also engendered
debate over the degree to which the influence of increased legal regulation of the work place will erode the level of judicial deference to and,
consequently, finality of arbitration awards.5 9 Furthermore, as fewer employees have a collectively bargained grievance procedure available to
them, commentators and policymakers have begun exploring arbitration's exportability from the collectively bargained grievance process to
the unorganized work force. 6°
Another major development in the thirty years since the Trilogy
which has had a major impact on the institution of labor arbitration has
56. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
57. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Gross, The Labor Arbitrator'sRole: Traditionand Change, 25 ARB. J. 221 (1970);
Howlett, The Arbitrator,The NLRB, and the Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 67 (1967); Malin & Stallworth, Affirmative Action
Issues and the Role of External Law in Labor Arbitration, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 745 (1990);
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology Law and Labor Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1967); Mittenthal, The Role
of Law in Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
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been the organization of public employees. In 1960, the public sector
was almost completely unorganized. Only 6 percent of all union members worked in the public sector. Wisconsin had enacted a public employment statute a year earlier which guaranteed municipal employees
the right to organize but which did not impose a duty to bargain on
public employers and contained no administrative structure to enforce
61
the act.
In the years following the Trilogy, public sector collective bargaining began to take root. In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive
Order 10,98862 which granted federal government employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively. In 1964, Congress enacted the Urban
Mass Transit Act which provided funds for local governments to take
over previously private mass transit systems. Section 13(c) of UMTA
required that the collective bargaining rights of transit employees be preserved in the process of converting their employment from the private to
the public sector. These and other developments led many states to enact
statutes granting public employees collective bargaining rights. In 1962,
Wisconsin placed administration of its public employee bargaining law in
the hands of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 63 WERB had
been administering the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act since 1939. It
naturally placed a private sector imprimatur on public sector labor law.
Today, most states have statutes granting public employees the right
to bargain collectively. This has had a dramatic effect on the growth of
public sector unions and the increase in the influence of public employees
in unions. In contrast to 1960, in 1984, public employment accounted
for 29 percent of all union members, and, a year later, 43.1 percent of all
government workers were represented by a labor union. 64 These unions'
collective bargaining agreements have accounted for a steadily increasing
share of the labor arbitration conducted in the United States. 65
The articles in this symposium address the impact of the changes in
61. Act of Oct. 2, 1959, ch. 509, no. 309, A., 1959 Wis. Laws 623.
62. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962) (1959-63 compilation), reprintedin 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 4269.

63. Act of Feb. 7, 1962, ch. 663. no. 336, A., 1962 Wis. Laws 917.
64. Congressional Research Service, supra note 35.
65. For example, during the period August 1984 through August 1985, 61.7 percent of the
labor arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration Association arose in the private sector
and 38.3 percent arose in the public sector. During the period January 1990 through October 1990,
the private sector's share of A.A.A.'s labor arbitrations declined to 50.6 percent and the public
sector share increased to 49.4 percent. Data supplied in a telephone conversation with Earl
Baderschneider, American Arbitration Association, January 24, 1991. See also A Look at Labor
Arbitration Trends of the '80's, STUDY TIME No. 3 (1991) p.1, 3 (In 1981 35 percent of A.A.A. cases
arose in the public sector; by 1990 the cases were almost evenly divided between public and private
sectors).
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the workplace in the three decades since the Trilogy on the law of and
institution of labor arbitration. In LaborArbitration as a Continuationof
the Collective BargainingProcess, Professor Charles Craver observes that
in the Trilogy, the Court recognized that labor arbitration must not be
viewed as a quasi-judicial proceeding. Rather, it is an integral part of the
collective bargaining process and the on-going relationship between the
union and employer. Judicial recognition of the arbitrator's role as the
parties' designated reader of the contract is the guiding force behind the
Trilogy's broad deference to arbitration, both in deciding whether to order a reluctant party to arbitrate and in deciding whether to enforce an
arbitrator's award. Professor Craver applauds the general acceptance of
this view by the lower courts in applying the Trilogy and observes their
salutary effects on labor relations. He criticizes the occasional decision
which appears to stray from these principles of judicial restraint.
Professor Craver then turns to the arbitrator's role in an era of increased regulation of the work place from authority outside the collective
bargaining agreement. He writes that where the parties in their contract
or through their submission agreement authorize an arbitrator to consider legal authority external to the contract, they have agreed to be
bound by that arbitrator's interpretation. They have concluded that
submission of external legal controversies to the arbitrator will have the
same salutary effects on their on-going collective bargaining relationship
as does submission of contractual issues. Under these circumstances,
courts should defer to the parties' agreement and enforce the arbitrator's
award unless the arbitrator's legal interpretations are unequivocally
erroneous.
Professor Craver next addresses the potential for conflict between an
arbitrator's award and public policy embodied in the law external to the
contract. To reconcile the arbitrator's role as part of the collective bargaining process with the court's role as guardian of public policy, Professor Craver urges that courts deny enforcement to arbitration awards only
if they would refuse to countenance the same result if the parties had
expressly agreed to it.
Turning to the National Labor Relations Board's policies for deferring unfair labor practice charges to the grievance and arbitration procedures, Professor Craver concludes that they too should be guided by the
role of arbitration in the collective bargaining process. He concludes that
current Board policy is over-broad. He urges that the NLRB defer prior
to arbitration only those charges under section 8(a)(5) which turn on the
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. He criticizes the
Board for deferring charges which assert individual rights to be free from
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anti- or pro-union discrimination and to be free from interference, restraint and coercion of section seven rights. He argues that such deferral
effectively uses arbitration as a quasi-judicial procedure and undermines
employee rights. Concerning post-arbitration deferral, Professor Craver
argues for broad deferral to arbitration awards in section 8(a)(5) cases,
but cautions against such broad deferral in individual rights cases. He
argues that the Board should treat an arbitration award in section 8(a)(1)
and section 8(a)(3) cases as it would a decision by an administrative law
judge, reviewing the facts for substantial evidence support and reviewing
the legal conclusions de novo.
Professor Craver expresses concern that labor arbitration has become more formalized in recent years. He is suggesting, perhaps, that
arbitration is beginning to resemble a quasi-judicial proceeding. He concludes with recommendations to the parties and arbitrators to ensure
that arbitration continues to play its salutary role as part of the on-going
collective bargaining process.
Professor Ann Hodges focuses on the growth of collective bargaining and, with it, arbitration in the public sector in The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector. She observes that initially arbitration in the
public sector was viewed as an unlawful delegation of governmental authority to a private party. Although courts today have generally rejected
this blanket prohibition on arbitration, concerns over delegability continue to infect judicial attitudes toward arbitration in the public sector.
Although some courts strictly apply the Trilogy to public sector labor
arbitration, some expressly reject it and others give it lip service but
reach results that are inconsistent with the Trilogy. Furthermore, in addition to pre-arbitration judicial review of the contract to determine arbitrability and post-arbitration judicial review of the award for consistency
with the arbitrator's authority, courts in the public sector also review
promises to arbitrate and arbitration awards for legality. The nondelegability doctrine furnishes the most common reason for judicial refusal to
enforce a promise to arbitrate or an arbitration award.
Professor Hodges addresses four common arguments for treating
public sector arbitration differently from its private sector counterpart.
These arguments are (1) the lack of sufficient experience with public sector labor arbitration to establish it firmly as a preferred method of dispute resolution; (2) the need to preserve decisionmaking authority to
those who are accountable to the public (an argument which Professor
Hodges characterizes as a restatement of the nondelegability doctrine);
(3) the public employer's statutory responsibility to provide services to
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the public; and (4) the prevalence of law external to the contract governing public sector employment.
Professor Hodges rejects the contention of insufficient experience
with public sector labor arbitration as empirically wrong and logically
unsound. Arbitration in the public sector serves the same function as a
continuation of the process of collective bargaining as it does in the private sector. She then focuses on the need for public accountability of
decisionmakers. She argues that the nondelegability doctrine is really an
issue of public policy review of the arbitration award. She argues for
narrow public policy review because a broad standard of public policy
would undermine the salutary effects of arbitration and interfere with the
duty to bargain.
Professor Hodges unmasks the argument based on the employer's
responsibility to provide services to the public as another version of the
nondelegability doctrine. In essence, the argument states that the public
employer has been delegated the authority to determine how best to
carry out its mission. Professor Hodges rejects this as a general proposition limiting arbitration because it is inconsistent with mandatory, or
even permissive, bargaining. She recognizes that there may be situations
where the legislature has delegated to the employer the exclusive authority to implement its mission and that in those cases arbitration must be
denied as a matter of law. She urges that such instances be confined to
statutes which unequivocally commit a matter to the employer's exclusive determination.
Finally, Professor Hodges considers the impact of a pervasive system of legal regulation of public employment on arbitration. She observes that this may result in arbitration awards which do not violate any
express command of positive law but, nevertheless, are based on an arbitrator's erroneous interpretation of the law. She urges that the arbitrator's error is not grounds for judicial intervention because the arbitrator's
interpretation is what the parties bargained for, it is not binding on anyone other than the immediate parties, and the parties remain free to correct it in subsequent negotiations. She concludes that the Trilogy should
apply with equal force in the public sector as it carries in the private
sector.
In Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy,
Only One for Lingle and Lueck, Professor Michael Harper addresses the
relationship between labor arbitration and state employment law. He observes that the Trilogy developed a presumption that the parties intended
to include all claims, including frivolous grievances, in their arbitration
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procedure unless they stated with positive assurance claims which were
to be excluded, and a presumption that the parties intended judicial enforcement of all awards based on the arbitrator's construction of the
agreement.
Professor Harper defends the Trilogy presumptions on several
grounds. The costs of bargaining for the level of arbitral authority established in the Trilogy may be high enough to make a difference in the
arbitration clause agreed to without benefit of the Trilogy presumptions.
This would be unfortunate because, in the Trilogy, the Court correctly
divined the normal expectations of unions and employers regarding arbitration. Hindsight has validated the Trilogy presumptions as parties have
rarely tried to contract around them. The Court took the best approach
by requiring a specific listing of matters not subject to arbitration, as this
provides greater ease and certainty when contracting around the presumptions than would a presumption of a narrower scope of arbitrability.
Professor Harper writes that all federal common law of collective
bargaining agreements under section 301 is subject to contracting
around. The Trilogy established a federal policy of channeling the parties
toward broad arbitral authority but did not require it. In this manner,
the Trilogy shows how a uniform section 301 law facilitates collective
bargaining.
Turning to section 301 preemption of state employment law, Professor Harper finds that the Supreme Court has focused its inquiry on
whether the state claim involves the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Professor Harper criticizes this as confusing a federal
policy that arbitrators should interpret collective bargaining agreements
in the first instance which informs the content of section 301 law with the
policy that dictates that section 301 law be applied uniformly in state, as
well as, federal courts. He urges basing section 301 preemption on the
need to apply uniform federal law to facilitate collective bargaining,
rather than the need to have an arbitrator, instead of a court, interpret
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
Professor Harper thus writes that the key preemption question is
whether state law rights exist independently of the collective bargaining
agreement. Section 301 preempts only state laws which purport to grant
additional negotiable rights to employees because of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The existence of such rights depends on the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, must be governed by section 301.
Professor Harper contends that section 301 preemption, like other
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aspects of section 301 law, only creates a presumption; in this case, a
presumption that the parties do not intend to create obligations and
rights defined by state law. This presumption makes sense in the same
way as the Trilogy. It furthers the congressional policy that the parties
control the collective bargaining agreement. It correctly divines that almost all parties will not want to complicate contract administration by
incorporating state law. Finally, it places the burden on the party wanting to rely on state law to say so expressly in negotiations.
Turning to nonwaivable state employment rights, Professor Harper
finds two problems with such state laws which leverage rights under a
collective bargaining agreement. They inhibit bargaining by making its
impact less certain and they inhibit bargaining by making the contractual
rights being leveraged more expensive for the union to obtain. At one
level, all state laws setting minimum employment standards raise overall
labor costs and thereby make the attainment of other contractual rights
more difficult for the union. But, Congress did not intend to preempt all
such state laws. Therefore, the key is whether state law makes negotiating a particular benefit more costly by attaching consequences to it.
Even here, Professor Harper sees a need to distinguish between state laws
which attach procedural remedies and those which attach substantive
rights to collectively bargained rights. Professor Harper applies his preemption analysis to numerous state employment laws yet to be considered by the Supreme Court.
Professor Samuel Estreicher in Arbitration of Employment Disputes
Without Unions and Professor Matthew Finkin in his commentary on
Professor Estreicher's article address exporting collectively bargained
grievance arbitration into the nonunion setting. Professor Estreicher observes that the Trilogy is premised on a substantive policy in favor of
arbitration because of its role in the collective bargaining process. He
finds this model of arbitration as an element of industrial self-government
inapplicable to the nonunion setting. Rather, in the absence of a union,
arbitration must be viewed as a substitute for litigation.
Professor Estreicher argues that agreements to arbitrate employment contract disputes between relatively sophisticated parties should be
enforced. Presumably, the parties are in the best position to decide
which forum best suits their interests. Arbitration is usually cheaper,
faster, produces a more acceptable result than litigation and saves public
resources. Employers may have an advantage if they are represented by
counsel when employees are not and because employers are repeat players who may be the source of future work for the arbitrators. Professor
Estreicher cautions against overstating these advantages and suggests
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that the development of an employees' bar may counter employer advantages. Professor Estreicher, however, rejects a Trilogy broad presumption of arbitrability because arbitration in the nonunion setting is based
on principles of voluntarism and freedom of contract rather than a policy
of promoting industrial self-government.
Professor Estreicher next considers the enforceability of arbitration
provisions in unilateral employer employment policies. He recognizes
that employees affected by these policies often will not be sophisticated
and may be disadvantaged by the absence of representation and by not
being repeat players. But, he argues, these potential disadvantages
should not defeat enforcement of these arbitration policies. Courts
should not pick and choose which unilateral employer policies they will
enforce. Furthermore, if courts refuse to enforce employer arbitration
policies, employers might be inclined to weaken or repeal their substantive employment policies, thereby leaving employees worse off.
Professor Estreicher writes that the impact of employees' lack of
representation and the repeat player phenomenon will be diminished if
the employer's policy provides for representation of employees.
Although technically outside this symposium, Professor Clyde Summers'
Kenneth M. Piper Memorial Lecture suggests one source of such representation-a union which has not attained the majority support necessary to serve as exclusive bargaining representative. Professor Estreicher
focuses on the possibility of a system of peer representatives. He confronts the argument that such a system may violate the N.L.R.A.'s prohibition on employer interference, domination or support of a labor
organization. He writes that it is difficult to understand why the use of
employee-advocates to represent employee-claimants threatens the conditions for forming independent unions. He concludes that a peer representation system would not violate the N.L.R.A.
Professor Estreicher next turns to written agreements to arbitrate all
employment claims. He contrasts the Supreme Court's consistent holdings that arbitration under collective bargaining agreements does not preclude litigation under employment statutes with the Court's decisions
applying commercial arbitration agreements to claims under other regulatory statutes. He proposes that individual agreements to arbitrate employment claims be reconciled with employment statutes by requiring
resort to pre-litigation administrative procedure before arbitrating and by
subjecting awards to judicial review for errors of law and clearly erroneous findings of fact.
Finally, Professor Estreicher considers proposals for statutory just
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cause protection for employees. He urges that arbitration of these claims
is inferior to submission of the claims to an administrative agency. The
agency can screen claims before hearing, can handle the claims at a lower
public cost, and will be in a better position to interpret and apply a statutory, as opposed to a contractual, just cause standard.
Professor Finkin disagrees with Professor Estreicher on several
points. He questions whether an employee, sophisticated or not, can prospectively knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to a judicial forum
for federal statutory rights through a general agreement to arbitrate any
disputes arising out of the employment relationship. He offers several
reasons why employees should not be bound to arbitrate their statutory
claims.
Professor Finkin writes that even the sophisticated employee who
expressly bargained the terms of her employment contract may not have
freely chosen prospectively to waive a judicial forum for her statutory
claims. Arbitration, with its absence of judicial safeguards and pre-hearing discovery, may not be an advantageous forum for such claims and it
is not likely that in making an initial employment contract, the employee
even contemplates that the employer might violate a federal statute in the
future. As for the unsophisticated employee who does not bargain over
her employment contract, subjecting her statutory claims to final and
binding arbitration allows the employer to dictate unilaterally the waiver
of the right to a judicial forum. Furthermore, Professor Finkin argues,
the enforcement of federal labor statutes implicates, not only the competing private interests of employer and employee, but also the public interest which led to the statutes' enactments. Public law should not be
privatized.
Professor Finkin also questions the level of deference courts should
give to arbitration awards regarding contractual employment rights. He
would condition judicial deference on the provision of a truly independent third party arbitrator and the employee's ability to be represented by
counsel of her choice.
Professor Finkin and Professor Estreicher agree that some of the
dangers of non-union arbitration systems arise if the employees cannot
secure competent representation. Professor Finkin disagrees with Professor Estreicher over the legality of employer-sponsored peer representation. Professor Finkin views such plans as falling within the broad sweep
on what is now section 8(a)(2) of the N.L.R.A.
Professor David Lewin, in his article, Grievance Proceduresin Nonunion Workplaces: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Out-
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comes, places the Estreicher-Finkin debate in an empirical context.
Professor Lewin's study finds that most employers have some type of
grievance procedure and a surprisingly substantial minority provide for
third party arbitration. Grievance procedure usage in the nonunion firm
is substantially lower than in a unionized company, but issues giving rise
to grievances are similar. The nonunion represented grievant is more
likely to intend to leave the employer whereas the union represented
grievant is more likely to intend to stay. The nonunion represented
grievant also is more likely to be subject to retaliation.
Finally, Professor Theodore St. Antoine's Afterword synthesizes all
of the other papers examining the adaptability of labor arbitration to a
changing workplace. After examining the numerous ways in which the
institution of labor arbitration has been and will continue to be called
upon to adapt to changing needs, Professor St. Antoine concludes the
symposium on a optimistic note, suggesting that the institution of labor
arbitration "go all the way from the private, contractual arbitration of
statutory issues to public, contractual arbitration and eventually reach
publicly mandated statutory arbitration in the private sector." In his
view, the "now-almost-venerable process [of labor arbitration] is up to
the challenge."

